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Abstract
As organizations constantly strive to improve strategies for ICT management, one of the major challenges
they must tackle is bring your own device (BYOD). BYOD is a term that collectively refers to the related
technologies, concepts, and policies in which employees are allowed to access internal corporate IT resources,
such as databases and applications, using their personal mobile devices like smartphones, laptop computers,
and tablet PCs [1]. It is a side effect of the consumerization of IT, a term used to describe the growing
tendency of the new information technologies to emerge first in the consumer market and then spread into
business and government organizations [2]. Basically, employees want to act in an "any-devices, anywhere"
work style, performing personal activities during work and working activities during personal time [2]. There
are several risks associated with BYOD [3, p. 63], and the big gaps in BYOD policies adopted by today's
organizations [4, p. 194] show that the solution to BYOD is not well understood. This article establishes a
background to understand BYOD risks by considering conditions that increase the occurrence of these risks
and the consequences of the risks occurring. It then aims to present the most commonly adopted BYOD
solutions, their limitations, and remedies, as well as important policy considerations for successfully
implementing them.
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As organizations constantly strive to improve strategies for ICT management, one of the 
major challenges they must tackle is bring your own device (BYOD). BYOD is a term that 
collectively refers to the related technologies, concepts, and policies in which employees are 
allowed to access internal corporate IT resources, such as databases and applications, using 
their personal mobile devices like smartphones, laptop computers, and tablet PCs [1]. It is a 
side effect of the consumerization of IT, a term used to describe the growing tendency of the 
new information technologies to emerge first in the consumer market and then spread into 
business and government organizations [2]. Basically, employees want to act in an “any-
devices, anywhere” work style, performing personal activities during work and working 
activities during personal time [2]. There are several risks associated with BYOD [3, p. 63], 
and the big gaps in BYOD policies adopted by today’s organizations [4, p. 194] show that the 
solution to BYOD is not well understood. This article establishes a background to understand 
BYOD risks by considering conditions that increase the occurrence of these risks and the 
consequences of the risks occurring. It then aims to present the most commonly adopted 
BYOD solutions, their limitations, and remedies, as well as important policy considerations 
for successfully implementing them.  
 
BYOD has gained huge popularity and adoption. A survey conducted by Cisco in 2012 on 
600 companies reveals that 95% of the surveyed companies are already permitting the use of 
personally owned smart devices in their work environments and assets [1], [5, p. 54], [6, p. 
65]. It is predicted that about half of all businesses will introduce a BYOD environment by 
2017 [1]. Research also shows that even when BYOD is not permitted, a large number of 
employees still use their device for work [1], with or without the knowledge of the IT 
department [4, p. 192]. This popularity and adoption of BYOD can be attributed to several 
factors, one of which is increase in convenience and efficiency of work [1]. For most 
companies, the reason for embracing the BYOD phenomenon is simple and always the same: 
it improves their productivity and reduces costs [7], [8], [9, p. 612], [10, p. 14], [11]. Other 
factors include the rapid development and popularization of smart devices such as tablet PCs 
and smartphones [12, p. 101], increase in market-based mobile apps in rich public stores [13], 
implementation of the wireless Internet environment [3, p. 62], increased use of desktop 
virtualization and cloud services, increased emphasis on real-time communication, and work 
continuity [1]. The growth of BYOD has even extended into other aspects like bring your 
own technology [5, p. 53], [14], [15, p. 1] and bring your own software, in which employees 
use non-corporate software and technology on their device [3, p. 62]. 
 
Despite all the hype about BYOD, there are hidden costs and security risks [6, p. 65] that 
must be considered before adopting BYOD. A common misconception about BYOD is that 
having employees purchase their own devices can save the company money, but recent data 
prove contrary, considering that it could actually be more expensive because of the difficulty 
of managing various platforms and the fact that BYOD solutions require the company to pay 
voice and data service charges for their employees’ devices [4, p. 193]. Companies 
sometimes only look at the cost of the device, but, when you look at the total picture, BYOD 
is more expensive [6, p. 66]. A recent study found that if a company with 1,000 mobile 
devices adopts BYOD, the company will spend an additional US$170,000 average per year 
[6, p. 65]. 
 
The hype about BYOD is further watered down if we consider BYOD risks and their 
consequences. BYOD risks include data loss/leakage or theft [11], [16, p. 12], [17], [18]; 
application security [16, p. 12]; network availability [17, p. 8]; legal liability and regulatory 
compliance [6, p. 65], [19, p. 5], [20, p. 29]; and loss of brand identity [6, p. 68].  
 
Conditions that Increase the Occurrence of BYOD Risks  
Certain factors increase the occurrence of BYOD risks. To start, when we allow enterprise 
and personal data to coexist on the same device, then it becomes very problematic to find a 
balance between a strict security control of enterprise and privacy of personal data, 
particularly when the device is not a corporate issued asset [3, p. 63]. This could also lead to 
data leakage if enterprise information is mistakenly sent to personal contacts [21, p. 9]. These 
devices are also always on and connected, so the vulnerability to malicious attacks increases 
through different communication channels [3, p. 63]. The situation becomes even worse 
when we consider that wireless connection environments on a smart device can be attacked 
more easily than desktop computer environments [22, p. 230]. 
 
In addition, it is very difficult for IT departments to support different phone/OS 
version/carrier combinations [6, p. 68], which are also constantly changing with technical 
advancement and get outdated very quickly [1], [3, p. 63], [21, p. 9]. Worse still, the extra 
portability of mobile devices poses serious challenges to the security of the devices, along 
with the information on them, as they can be very easily lost or stolen [3, p. 63]. We should 
also remember that because of the increased processing power and memory of smartphones 
and tablet computers, increased data transmission capabilities of the mobile phone networks, 
and open and third-party extensible operating systems for mobile devices, they become an 
interesting target for attackers [7]. These attackers rely on cyberweapons such as malware, 
spam, phishing, and fake Wi-Fi [22, p. 230], further increasing risk to BYOD [3, p. 63]. 
Some disgruntled employees may also share confidential business data on personal devices 
with competitors, leading to a competitive disadvantage for the organization [3, p. 63]. 
 
Consequences of the Occurrence of BYOD Risks  
According to an industrial report, nearly 60% of companies are vulnerable to BYOD risks [4, 
p. 194], and there are several consequences that abound from the occurrence of these risks. 
Confidential data like e-mail, documents, reports, files, applications, usernames and 
passwords, installed certificates, banking information, and web accounts can be accessible if 
a device is compromised or if it lost/stolen. Spam received from known or unknown sources 
can also cause waste of resources such as bandwidth and memory space [3, p. 63]. 
 
It is being reported that nearly half of enterprises that allow employee-owned devices to 
connect to a company’s network have experienced a data breach [8]. These breaches can 
attract compliance liability [4, p. 196], cost enterprises millions of dollars each year, and, 
more importantly, result in decreased customer trust or even complete loss of customers [12, 
p. 100].  
 
With the adoption of BYOD, some companies have started to notice increased work activities 
during holiday leave as employees are tempted to check their e-mail and other work-related 
information [17, p. 7]. This can result in a huge problem when we consider that the use of 
home smartphones leads to increased work-to-life conflict, which, in turn, creates job stress 
[15, p. 5] and family conflict. 
 
Methods 
A search for relevant publications was undertaken first in Google Scholar and then other 
databases, including IEEE Xplore, Scopus, Web of Science, and ScienceDirect. The search 
terms bring your own device, BYOD, bring your own technology, BYOT, mobile devices, IT 
consumerization, BYOD policy, and BYOD solution were used as keywords to identify 
articles. 
 
Peer-reviewed journals and conferences were prioritized, and all nonscholarly articles were 
removed, except for articles from trade journals that are peer-reviewed. Key information was 
then extracted from relevant publications using coding techniques. 
 
BYOD Technical Solutions, Limitations, and Important Policy Considerations  
The best defence in response to litigation arising from a data breach is to demonstrate that the 
company actively attempted to mitigate threats inherent in its business model [23]. It is, 
therefore, important for organizations to understand the different BYOD technical solutions 
and their limitations before adopting BYOD. These technological solutions can hardly stand 
alone; there is also a need to combine them with appropriate BYOD policies [24]. While we 
admit that it is difficult to enforce corporate policies on personal devices [21, p. 9], the first 
place to start when implementing BYOD still remains to establish a BYOD policy [25, p. 
118] that leaves no gaps. Several studies have noted that there are big gaps in BYOD policies 
adopted by today’s organizations. Table 1 presents the most commonly adopted BYOD 
solutions in the market, their limitations, and important policy considerations for successful 
implementation. It is also recommended that organizations consider other standard security 
measures applicable to the non-BYOD environment, such as robust firewalls, antimalware 
software [17, p. 9], authentication, SSL and TLS encryption, an intrusion detection system, 
identity and access management [19, p. 5], network access control, application access control, 












Table 1: BYOD Solutions, Limitations, and Policy Considerations 
BYOD Solution Limitations and Proposed Solutions Important Policy Considerations 
Mobile Device Management (MDM): 
This is a technology that gives full control 
over mobile devices by using software 
solution to lock down, control, encrypt, 
and enforce policies on the devices [2]. An 
MDM consists of two components, an 
MDM agent which is installed on mobile 
devices and an MDM server which is used 
to communicate and control functions on 
the MDM agent [26, p. 190].  MDM 
considers three issues when managing 
devices namely, device management, 
security management, and file 
synchronisation [3, p. 68]. 
  
MDM is a major step towards reducing 
data leakage, loss of organizational control 
and visibility [7].  
 
An increasing number of organisations are 
undertaking the implementation of MDM 
[16, p. 12]. MDM has certain features 
which make it the first BYOD solution 
each organization wants to implement. 
Some of these features include device 
registration, connection setup, user 
authentication, passcode, encryption, and 
compliance, restrictions based on the use 
of device features or applications 
restrictions based on platform or version. 
Besides being able to configure profiles, 
time-based profiles, certificates, accounts, 
MDM can also be used to monitor 
policies, location, alerts, rules etc. [27, p. 
154]. .Some popular vendors that provide 
MDM services include Vmware 
(AirWatch), MobileIron, and FiberLink 
[21, p. 10]. Other MDM tools include 
AmTel MDM, FancyFon [27, p. 155], 
Maas360, Zenprise MobileManager, and a 
lot more [11]. 
 
MDM can be applied specifically to only 
applications on a device instead of on the 
entire device. This is called Mobile 
Application Management (MAM) [27, p. 
155], [2]. With MAM specific corporate 
applications can be locked down, 
controlled and secured, while everything 
else on the mobile device is left up to the 
user [2]. AirWatch by Vmware, is an 
example of a popular MAM [21, p. 10].  
 
Similarly, MDM can be applied 
specifically to only critical corporate 
information on a device instead of on the 
entire device. This is called Mobile 
Information Management (MIM) [26, p. 
190].  MIM could roughly be described as 
MDM solutions suffer from coarse granularity of control [4, p. 
195]. 
 
A major limitation of this solution is that it is difficult to 
identify terminal context information. As a result, internal data 
leaks can be initiated by a malicious user through abnormal 
terminal behaviours, such as using a stolen terminal or a 
spoofed account, illegal temporary private wireless AP 
installation, connection and removal within the company. It is 
also difficult to detect internal data accesses and malicious 
behaviours as a result of abuse and misuse of the authority [1]. 
 
System-level network layer access and behavioural analysis 
for network data are also impossible [1]. 
 
Another major limitation of this solution is users’ 
psychological repulsion to the control of personal devices. 
Users are reluctant about MDM agent installation on their 
personal devices in demanding their privacy protection [1].  
 
In addition, MDM blocks or even reset devices by relying on 
security policy specified through application black- or 
whitelists, without behavioural analysis in place (Armando, et 
al. 2014, p. 49). “These lists—and hence the policy—are often 
based on vague concepts” [13, p. 49].  
 
Several solutions have being proposed to address this 
problems, including BYODroid, a prototype implementation of 
a security framework for the Android OS that validates 
behavioural models from applications against security policy, 
and hence ensures that only applications complying with the 
organisation security policy can be installed [28, p. 3], [29]. 
Similar work include the secure meta-market (SMM), which is 
a security-enabled application that enforces BYOD security 
policies through analysis and monitoring of multiple mobile 
applications [28], [29]. 
 
In addition, Costantino et al. [8] proposes a framework to 
enforce on-the-fly instantiated policies inside organization 
using trusted BYOD technologies. It implements a role-based 
access control system such that each user receives a specific 
policy from a server, based upon her identity or role and 
current context. The framework uses Oauth 2.0 to confirm 
effective user identity and Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 
installed on each device to ensure integrity [8]. 
 
Still in an effort to overcome the limitation of MDM to detect 
abnormal access and use of terminal devices on a real-time 
basis, Koh et al. [1] developed Dynamic Access Control 
System Based on Context. The system is comprised of a 
collection system to collect context information of a device 
under agentless mode, a detection system to detect users’ 
IT department must adhere to organisation’s policies 
and requirements when implementing device control 
[26, p. 190].  
 
In order not to incur a fine or serious reputational 
damage as a result of breach of applicable monitoring 
and data protection legislation (e.g. Data Protection 
Act 1998, DPA), employers who wish to monitor 
employees’ mobile devices must have policy in place 
that ensures they do so lawfully. They must also take 
steps to inform employees that their communications 
and use of the mobile devices may be monitored and 
why   [31, p. 39]. 
 
End user must be educated about specific policies that 
guard the control of their mobile devices. Policy 
should include provision for enterprise and 
employees to sign an End User Agreement (EUA) to 
create a common understanding about liability [2].  
 
BYOD policy should state what are the companies’ 
rights to audit and monitor privately owned devices 
during an investigation [17, p. 9] and this must be 
well communicated and agreed with the employees. 
 
Policy should address how MDM may be used to 
remotely lock or wipe data if tablet is stolen or lost 
[7] and for when employee leaves the company [21, 
p. 10]. For instance if the stolen tablet is a private 
device owned by the employee, rather than wiping a 
personal tablet, the company can compartmentalize 
corporate and personal data upfront with multiple 
profiles, for example, and decommission the device 
without harming anyone’s personal files [7].  
 
BYOD policy should address how and when to obtain 
consent, if employer wishes to monitor employee’s 
device [31, p. 39]. 
 
 
BYOD policy should clearly identify which devices 
can be used in the company network, listing both 
banned and allowed and apps, and describing 
categories of data that shouldn’t be stored locally 
after being used by a mobile app [21, p. 10]. 
 
Backup and recovery strategies should also be 
all those “Dropbox-like” cloud-based 
services that allow enterprise information 
to be stored in a central location and 
securely shared between different 
endpoints and platforms [2]. 
 
abnormal and malicious behaviours based on known user’s 
profile, and a control system to implement access control 
according to detection results and policies [1]. Devices are 
isolated and agent is installed if users/devices are detected to 
do abnormal or malicious behaviours while using networks 
[1]. This builds on previous study of abnormal behaviour 
detection in BYOD environment [9, p. 615].  
 
Castro et al. [30] proposes Secured Application Framework 
for Enterprise (SAFE), a comprehensive solution that enables 
enterprise and consumer applications to coexist side-by-side 
on the same device, giving the user a seamless experience. 
Unlike other solutions proposed above, this solution is 
designed to solve security and other related issues associated 
with using mobile applications in BYOD context. 
 
addressed [4, p. 194]. 
 
Policy should stipulate the mobile operating system 
supported by the company. It is important to note that 
the OS of the device determines how the device 
connects to the company’s data, and what types of 
app can be installed as well [25, p. 119]. A certain OS 
might also be preferred or rejected based on security 
ground. For instance iOS operating system for Apple 
devices is susceptible to jailbreaking and Android 
devices are vulnerable to rooting [12, p. 103]. The 
same iOS has a security plus in that it enforces 
application sandboxing to isolate applications from 
each other, such that an application cannot access 
files in another application’s directory [32, p. 14].  
To ensure that data removed from a device cannot be 
read elsewhere even if it is stolen or otherwise 
compromised, policy must enforce that data stored on 
devices should be encrypted [7]. 
Application virtualization and desktop 
virtualization: With virtualization, users 
remotely access computing resources at a 
corporate facility in such a way that 
corporate data is not stored and corporate 
apps are not processed on personal devices 
[21, p. 10]. End users receive just an 
image of their environment that runs in the 
datacentre or server network [2].  
 
It is a security control in which aspects 
like firewall, anti-X, 
intrusion prevention, patching, backup, 
data encryption and even business 
continuity are addressed and managed 
centrally without leaving some tasks to the 
end users. Examples include solutions 
from Vmware and Citrix [2]. 
Although virtualisation may have its own peculiar technical 
and implementation issues, it stands out as being privacy-
friendly when compared with other BYOD solutions like 
MDM. This is because it is a hand-off approach, where the 
enterprise strives to interfere less with the worker’s device [2]. 
There is therefore little or no issue of privacy invasion.  
In order to prevent illegal data movement or remote 
storage misuse, virtualization systems should 
implement other critical points for policies 
enforcement. For instance policies to: (1) Deny cut 
and paste data transfers between the virtual desktop 
and the end-user’s local clipboard running on the 
client device. (2) Configure client drive redirection 
mechanisms to deny the ability to transfer files from 
the datacentre to the local device or vice-versa. (3) 




This article sheds some light on the most commonly adopted BYOD solutions, with the aim 
to show their limitations and remedies as well as important policy considerations for 
successful implementation. Two types of BYOD solutions were considered: first, MDM and 
its MAM and MIM variations; and, second, application and desktop virtualization. We found 
that MDM is the first BYOD solution most organizations want to implement, yet it has 
several limitations, such as users’ psychological repulsion to the control of personal devices 
for privacy reasons, risks of basing policy on vague concepts, coarse granularity of control, 
and inadequacy in detecting users’ abnormal and malicious behaviours. 
 
Although several ground-breaking solutions have been proposed to remedy these problems, 
some of these solutions may also attract privacy concerns and hence suffer from poor 
adoption. For instance, in the detection system “dynamic access control system based on 
context” proposed by Koh et al. [1], users are required to be profiled, and such data will 
normally include privacy-invading data about users such as location data [1]. This is a 
concern that can affect the adoption of this technology. 
 
On the other hand, we found that application and desktop virtualization stands out as being 
privacy friendly because it is a hand-off approach and the enterprise interferes less with the 
worker’s device [2]. Yet, application and desktop virtualization is not as popular as MDM. 
This could be a result of the high cost and difficulties associated with implementing and 
supporting application and desktop virtualization. In both cases, we also found that there are 




There are several risks associated with BYOD, and the solutions are not well understood. 
This article guides the choice of BYOD solution by showing the limitations and remedies, as 
well as important policy considerations for successfully implementing some of the most 
commonly adopted BYOD solutions. We found that application and desktop virtualization 
stands out as being privacy friendly when compared to MDM, but it is not yet as popular as 
MDM, which has several limitations. In both cases, we also found that there are certain key 
policy considerations to take into account to successfully implement these solutions. Future 
research will delve more into understanding the reasons why privacy friendly application and 
desktop virtualization is not as popular as MDM and how it can be improved to make it as 
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